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Annually, the European Union (EU) spends around 55
billion euros on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
with the aim of supporting farmers’ income and the
production of public goods and externalities, such as
landscape and a clean environment (EC, 2013, 2014). The
majority of CAP subsidies are disbursed in the form of
decoupled direct payments, the so-called Single Payment
Scheme (SPS). The other two most important CAP instru-
ments are Coupled Direct Payments (CDP) and the Rural
Development Programme (RDP). The objective of this
study is to analyse the income distributional effects of the
three main CAP instruments in the EU: CDP, the SPS and
the RDP. The aim of the study is to provide scientific
support for the policy-making decision process. Farm
income support is one of the main priorities of the CAP,
and thus analysing its transfer efficiency is an important
element in the policy evaluation process. We
econometrically estimate the income distributional effects
of each of the three types of CAP subsidies. By employing
a large firm-level panel dataset for the period 1995–2007,
we are able to capture both the inter-temporal variation
due to CAP reforms, and cross-sectional differences in the
CAP implementation across EU member states (MS).
Previous theoretical literature has studied the farm
income distributional effects of agricultural policy exten-
sively. Alston and James (2002), de Gorter and Meilke
(1989), Dewbre et al (2001), Gardner (1983) and Guyomard
et al (2004) have analysed how income distributional
effects differ between subsidy types: that is, coupled
versus decoupled. Desquilbet and Guyomard (2002) and
Sheldon et al (2001) have analysed how income distribu-
tional effects differ among the agents along the vertical
chain. McCorriston and Sheldon (1991), Salhofer and
Schmid (2004) and Ciaian and Swinnen (2006, 2009)
examined how income distributional effects depend on
input and output market imperfections. Finally, de Gorter
(1992) and Munk (1994) looked at how they depend on
policy implementation details. Another strand of empiri-
cal literature applies partial equilibrium (PE) and general
equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate the distributional
effects of agricultural subsidies (for example, Dewbre et al,
2001; Kancs and Weber, 2001; Gohin and Moschini, 2006;
Hubbard, 1995; Salhofer and Schmid, 2004; Gocht et al,
2013). Although the PE and CGE simulation models can
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capture complex linkages present in agricultural markets,
the simulated effects often depend on calibrated or
arbitrary assumed parameter values, which is a common
aspect for criticism.
The empirical literature tends to support the theoretical
findings that not only agricultural producers, but also
other market participants along the vertical chain, may
benefit from agricultural subsidies. For example, accord-
ing to Goodwin et al (2003), Weersink et al (1999), Lence
and Mishra (2003), Roberts et al (2003), Kirwan (2009),
Michalek et al (2014), Ciaian and Kancs (2012), Kilian et al
(2012); Guastella et al (2013), Barnard et al (1997) and
Patton et al (2008), between 20% and 100% of the coupled
subsidies are leaked to landowners by increasing the land
sale and/or rental prices, whereas for the decoupled
subsidies the leakage rate is found to be slightly lower
(between 10% and 80%). However, several studies em-
ploying EU data have found low rates of subsidy
capitalization into land values, suggesting that farms may
benefit from the CAP proportionally more than other
agricultural market participants (Michalek et al, 2014;
Guastella et al, 2013).
The main contribution of this paper to the existing
literature is in providing new evidence of the income
distributional effect of the CAP across the EU member
states. Most of the literature on agricultural subsidies and
income transfer efficiency focuses on their impact on land
prices. We also assess how the income distributional
effects of the decoupled CAP subsidies (SPS) compare to
the coupled and RDP policy measures. To our knowledge
there is no study available in the literature analysing the
income distributional effects of different CAP subsidies.
Common Agricultural Policy in the EU
The CAP has undergone several major reforms since 1992,
characterized by a move away from price support towards
direct payments to farmers (Pillar 1). In particular, the
1992 reform introduced coupled area and animal pay-
ments. These coupled payments replaced the previous
price intervention mechanism, which supported farm
incomes through maintaining EU prices of agricultural
commodities higher than the world prices. The 2003
reform has progressively decoupled these payments from
production and introduced decoupled payments, the so-
called SPS. The SPS is now by far the largest component of
the CAP budget. In parallel, the CAP budget has been
partially reoriented towards the RDP funded by the
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
under Pillar 2 of the CAP (EC, 2011). The latest CAP
reform was adopted in 2013 (EC, 2013). This CAP reform
maintained both the RDP and SPS as major policy instru-
ments in the current financial period 2014–2020, but
linked them more closely with rural development and the
provision of public goods and externalities (EU, 2013).
The CAP reforms changed significantly the distribution
of different types of subsidies in the total CAP budget
over time. The share of CDP increased from around 22%
of the total CAP budget in 1992 to around 70% in 2000. In
contrast, the 2003 CAP reform reduced the share of CDP;
by 2007 they represented only around 10% of the CAP
budget. The SPS share increased from zero in 2003 to
around 58% in 2007 and is expected to stay at around 60%
after 2013. Finally, the share of the RDP in the total CAP
budget increased from less than 8% in 1992 to around
20%, and is expected to maintain this level under the 2013
CAP reform (European Commission, 2013).
Coupled Direct Payments
CDP were introduced by the MacSharry reform in 1992
and were further increased by Agenda 2000. The 2003
CAP reform significantly reduced CDP by introducing the
decoupled payments (SPS). However, even with the SPS
introduction, the member states (MS) could maintain a
certain share of direct payments coupled to crop or animal
production instead of disbursing them as decoupled
payments. Under the 2003 CAP reform, for cereals, oilseed
and protein crops 25% of direct payments could be linked
to production, or alternatively 40% of supplementary
durum wheat aid could be coupled. Other options of
coupling direct payments to production included 50% of
the sheep and goat premium, 100% of the suckler cow
premium and 40% of the slaughter premium or 100% of
the slaughter premium with up to 75% of the special male
premium. In the dairy sector, member states could opt for
decoupling either in 2005, or at the latest in 2007. Accord-
ing to the 2013 CAP reform, member states can allocate to
CDP up to 15% of the total national direct payment
budget.
CDP are available to farms in all MS, and include crop
area direct payments and animal direct payments. The
crop CDP includes area payments for cereals, oilseeds,
protein crops, rice and set-aside. In general, they are land-
based subsidies linked to the cultivation of certain crops,
implying that the level of the crop CDP does not depend
on production level, but on the area cultivated with
eligible crops. The value of CDP per hectare is regionally
differentiated. The coupled animal direct payments
include various types of subsidies such as the suckler cow
premium, beef premium, slaughter premium and ewe
premium. These subsidies are either output (animal) type
of payments (such as beef premiums, slaughter premi-
ums) or subsidies linked to non-land input (such as the
suckler cow premium or ewe premium), which may affect
the stock of breeding livestock.
Single Payment Scheme
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the
decoupled subsidies (referred to as ‘Green Box’ measures)
which do not distort production, or at most cause minimal
distortion, are allowed without limits, whereas the cou-
pled subsidies which are production-distorting (referred
to as ‘Amber Box’ measures) are subject to displacement
(WTO, 2003). In response to pressure from the WTO that
the EU was providing an unfair competitive advantage by
supporting its agricultural sector, the CAP was signifi-
cantly reformed in 2003. The previous CAP subsidy
system (Agenda 2000), based on coupled area and animal
payments, was to a large extent replaced by the decoupled
SPS starting in 2005. The aim was to shift agricultural
support towards non-distortive polices. The SPS is allo-
cated as a fixed set of payments per farm, independent of
production level. Farms are entitled to yearly payments,
depending on the amount of the SPS entitlements and the
eligible area of land. Whereas the entitlements give the
right for a farm to receive a per hectare payment, the SPS
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is linked to land because, in the absence of land, farms
cannot activate (cash in) the SPS entitlements. An entitle-
ment can be activated only if it is accompanied by one
hectare of eligible land, which can be rented on or owned
by the farm claiming the payment. However, the SPS is
not linked to a specific land area – the SPS entitlements
can be activated by any eligible farmland in the region.
Farms can expand or decrease their stock of entitlements
by buying or selling entitlements on the market from
other farms.
Farm eligibility for the SPS is subject to cross-compli-
ance. The 2013 CAP reform introduced further
environmental requirements, the so-called ‘greening
measure’ aimed at improving the environmental perform-
ance of farms. Each farm that receives the SPS must
comply with the Statutory Management Requirements
(SMR) and maintain the agricultural land in Good Agri-
cultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC). The SMR
are based on pre-existing EU Directives and Regulations
in the fields of environment, public, animal and plant
health and animal welfare. The aim of the GAEC is to
prevent the abandonment and severe undermanagement
of agricultural land. The ‘greening’ includes three meas-
ures: crop diversification, maintenance of permanent
grassland and ecological focus area (set-aside).
The SPS is supplemented by an additional ‘greening’
payment taking up to 30% of the SPS funds, if farms
respect the ‘greening’ requirements or measures men-
tioned above. Under crop diversification, cultivation of
the arable land needs to include at least two different
crops on farms cultivating between 10 and 30 hectares of
arable land and at least three crops on farms with a larger
arable area. The main crop should not exceed 75% of
arable land, and the two main crops should not exceed
95% of the arable area. Under the maintenance of perma-
nent grassland, farms are required not to convert and
plough permanent grassland. The ecological focus area
requires farms larger than 15 hectares to set aside at least
5% of the farm’s eligible area (excluding areas under
grassland), with the possibility of increasing this percent-
age to 7%, subject to an evaluation review in 2017. The
area that qualifies as ecological focus area includes land
left fallow, terraces, landscape features and buffer strips.
In order to avoid penalizing those farms that already
address environmental and sustainability issues, the
‘Greening Equivalency’ system is applied, whereby the
application of environmentally beneficial practices al-
ready in place is considered to replace these three basic
greening requirements (EU, 2013; European Commission,
2013). The aim of these measures is to impose a stronger
linkage of the SPS to ‘agricultural practices beneficial to
the climate and environment’.
Rural Development Programme
RDP support includes different policy measures each
focusing on a specific area of rural development. In
general, the RDP measures can be regrouped into eight
socioeconomic areas of rural development: farm restruc-
turing and competitiveness; improvement of human
capital; innovation; provision of basic rural services and
related infrastructure; improving the quality of agricul-
tural products; support for sustainable use of agricultural
land; diversification of the rural economy; and support for
improvement of the environment (Copus et al, 2007;
Dwyer, 2005). A further regrouping can be done based on
targeting the RDP measures, which can be targeted either
at the farm level (for example, investment support, agri-
environmental support, Less Favoured Area (LFA)
payments) or at the rural community level (for example,
infrastructural investments). In this paper we focus on the
RDP allocated to farms: LFA payments, agri-environmen-
tal payments and investment support.
LFA and agri-environmental payments are a compensa-
tory type of aid (Dwyer, 2005) granted as annual
payments to farmers in less productive areas under multi-
annual contracts. Agri-environmental payments are
offered for the provision of environmental management
services. They are granted for a range of farm activities
aimed at improving the environment on the farm. These
payments should cover additional costs and farm income
foregone resulting from adoption of environmental
management practices on-farm. The environmental
payments particularly affect farm input use, because they
are conditional on the adoption of environmentally
friendly production practices, such as fertilizer reduction,
organic farming, intensification of livestock, conversion of
arable land to grassland, rotation measures and support of
biodiversity (EC, 2005).
Investment aids usually cover only a share of the total
cost of a one-off or short-term programme of investment
activity and farm practices on a farm (capital items) or for
a farmer (training courses and other qualifications). These
may be designed to improve the efficiency of an agricul-
tural aspect of the business, or they may be intended to
enable a farm to diversify into non-farming activities
(farm shops, processing and marketing activities, tourist
accommodation). Investment support measures enable the
application of more efficient technology, knowledge
spillovers and more efficient practices to farmers. They
also cover output-related support in terms of marketing
costs and market access transaction costs.
Theoretical hypothesis
As noted in the introduction, there is an extensive theo-
retical literature assessing the income distributional
effects of agricultural subsidies. These studies find that
although farms are the direct recipients of subsidies, they
usually do not fully absorb them. According to previous
literature, a farm’s profits may be affected by subsidies
through several channels. First, subsidies may increase
input prices (for example, fertilizers, land and capital),
thus channelling policy benefit to input suppliers. Second,
subsidies may lead to lower output prices, thus generat-
ing policy gains for consumers. Third, subsidies may
interact with other markets (as in credit constraint) or may
alter farm behaviour (substitute private farm activities),
which may enhance or reduce farm profits depending on
the type of induced effect. The overall subsidy effect on
farm profits depends on the magnitudes of these multiple
factors.
According to theoretical studies, CDP and RDP are
expected to have the strongest impact on input and
output prices, and hence a significant share of policy rents
may be leaked to other market participants (such as
consumers and input suppliers) (for example, Floyd, 1965;
22 Outlook on AGRICULTURE Vol 44, No 1
Income distributional effects of CAP subsidies
Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter and Meilke, 1989;
Gardner, 1983; Guyomard et al, 2004; Salhofer, 1996; Ciaian
and Swinnen, 2006, 2009). The reason is that both CDP
and RDP are linked to a specific input use (for example,
land) or output produced, and thus stimulate farms’
demand on input markets and higher supply of produc-
tion on output markets. Both effects have a detrimental
impact on farm income, as stronger input demand in-
creases input prices, while higher availability of supply on
the output market reduces their prices. The actual market
price change depends on the input supply and output
demand elasticities. These elasticities determine price
adjustments resulting from subsidy-induced input supply
and output demand changes. Inelastic demand and
supply lead to large adjustments in prices, implying that
subsidies may be leaked from farms to other market
participants by reducing the prices paid by consumers or/
and increasing prices received by input suppliers. In the
reverse case of an elastic output demand and input
supply, the price response to subsidies is small and
farmers will probably be the main subsidy beneficiaries.
The income distributional effect of the SPS is expected
to be lower, because it is fully decoupled from production
and only partially coupled to input (land) use. Courleux et
al (2008), Kilian and Salhofer (2008) and Ciaian et al (2008)
show that the income distributional effect of the SPS
largely depends on the ratio of the eligible area to the
total number of entitlements. If the allocated entitlements
are in deficit relative to the eligible area of land, then the
SPS benefits farmers. However, if the allocated entitle-
ments are in surplus, then the SPS gets capitalized into
higher land values, generating positive gains to landown-
ers, but lower (or zero) benefits to farmers. The main
intuition behind these results is that, in the presence of
surplus entitlements, farmers will not be able to activate
all their entitlements with the available area of land.
Profit-maximizing farmers will compete for additional
land in order to activate their unused entitlements.
Competing farmers will overbid the market price for land
until it equals marginal economic profitability and the
value of entitlement. As a result, the SPS will be capital-
ized into land prices and will mainly benefit landowners.
The effect of competitive pressure in the case of deficit
entitlement is reversed. If land is in surplus relative to
entitlements, farmers will compete for entitlements to
benefit from the SPS. The SPS will be captured by the
entitlement owners (that is, farms) and will not be re-
flected in higher land prices.
Other important factors that may affect the actual
income distributional effects of subsidies (valid for CDP,
RDP and SPS) include various market rigidities, farm
behavioural effects and region-specific aspects such as
credit market imperfections (Ciaian et al, 2010; Brandsma
et al, 2013). The exact impact depends on the particulari-
ties of these factors and on how they interact with
subsidies in particular. For example, subsidies may induce
productivity gains if farmers are credit-constrained.
Subsidies may be substituted for missing finance if farms
are credit-constrained, leading to higher input use and
hence higher farm productivity and farm income (Ciaian
and Swinnen, 2009). Another effect of subsidies (in
competitive markets) could be that subsidies may induce
farm behavioural changes which may cancel out (or
crowd out) private farm activities. For example, Brandsma
et al (2013) have shown that the RDP investment support
may fully crowd out (substitute) private investments of
farms in competitive markets, implying that farm invest-
ment would also be undertaken without the support. In
this case, the RDP investment support has no impact on
farm productivity but represents a full income transfer to
farms.
Econometric strategy
Econometric model
As mentioned above, theoretical studies have shown that
subsidies affect farm profits both directly (by altering the
subsidy amount received and farm behaviour) and
indirectly (by affecting output and input prices). They
further found that the magnitude of the income distribu-
tional effects depends on the type of subsidies. Following
the theoretical studies and assuming a profit-maximizing
farm, the optimal farm profit depends on input and
output prices, subsidies and farm characteristics (Floyd,
1965; Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter and Meilke, 1989;
Gardner, 1983; Guyomard et al, 2004; Salhofer, 1996; Ciaian
and Swinnen, 2006, 2009):
∏ = ∏[p(CDP, RDP, SPS), r(CDP, RDP, SPS),
w(CDP,RDP, SPS), CDP, RDP, SPS, X] + ε
(1)
where p is the price of the final product, r is the rental
price of land, and w is the price of non-land inputs, CDP
are crop coupled subsidies, RDP are rural development
payments, SPS are decoupled payments, X is a vector of
observable covariates and ε is the residual.
The profit equation (1) accounts for both the direct and
indirect effect of subsidies on farm profits. Totally differ-
entiating equation (1) yields the following relationship
between profits and subsidies:
⎡ ∂∏ ∂p ∂∏ ∂r ∂∏ ∂w ∂∏ ⎤
d∏ = ⎢ —– ——– + —– ——– + —– ——– + ——– ⎥ dCDP⎣ ∂p ∂CDP ∂r ∂CDP ∂w ∂CDP ∂CDP ⎦
⎡ ∂∏ ∂p ∂∏ ∂r ∂∏ ∂w ∂∏ ⎤
+ ⎢ —– ——– + —– ——– + —– ——– + ——– ⎥ dRDP⎣ ∂p ∂RDP ∂r ∂RDP ∂w ∂RDP ∂RDP ⎦
⎡ ∂∏ ∂p ∂∏ ∂r ∂∏ ∂w ∂∏ ⎤
+ ⎢ —– ——– + —– ——– + —– ——– + ——– ⎥ dSPS⎣ ∂p ∂SPS ∂r ∂SPS ∂w ∂SPS ∂SPS ⎦
∂∏
+ —– dX + ε (2)∂X
where ∂∏/∂p ∂p/∂s,  ∂∏/∂r ∂r/∂s and ∂∏/∂w ∂w/∂s are parameters
representing the indirect impact of subsidies on profits
(that is, through subsidy impact on input and output
prices) and ∂∏/∂s is the direct effect of subsidies on profits,
for s = CDP, RDP, SPS.
Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
d∏ = δ0 + δCDPdCDP + δRDPdRDP + δSPSdSPS + δXdX + ε (3)
where
δX = ∂∏/∂X, δCDP = ∂∏/∂p ∂p/∂CDP + ∂∏/∂r ∂r/∂CDP + ∂∏/∂w ∂w/∂CDP
+  ∂∏/∂CDP,  δRDP = ∂∏/∂p ∂p/∂RDP + ∂∏/∂r ∂r/∂RDP+ ∂∏/∂RDP
and δSPS = ∂∏/∂p ∂p/∂SPS + ∂∏/∂r ∂r/∂SPS + ∂∏/∂w ∂w/∂SPS + ∂∏/∂SPS
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Parameters δs (for s = CDP, RDP, SPS) measure the net
impact of subsidies on farm profits by accounting for both
direct and indirect subsidy effects. In other words, they
indicate the income effects of subsidies in terms of policy
rents, which farmers receive for each additional euro of
CAP subsidies.
Estimation issues
The estimation of equation (3) is subject to individual
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. Addressing these
issues is crucial for obtaining consistent estimates of the
incidence of agricultural subsidies on farm income.
Individual heterogeneity.  According to the underlying
theoretical model, equation (3) contains the key variables
determining the incidence of agricultural subsidies.
However, in addition to these included explanatory
variables, there are also unobservable farm characteristics
(such as farmer ability, which affects farm income), which
at the same time are correlated with explanatory variables
in equation (3). The positive correlation between CAP
payments and the time-invariant unobserved factors that
influence productivity will upwardly bias the estimated
effect of subsidies on farm income. In addition, transient
shocks, such as drought or pests, may also affect income
and CAP subsidies. Ignoring the time-varying region
fixed effects would yield biased estimates.
Endogeneity.  If subsidies were assigned to farms ran-
domly, then parameter δs (for s = CDP, RDP, SPS) in
equation (3) would correctly measure the farm income
increase per additional euro of subsidy. In reality, how-
ever, CAP subsidies are not assigned randomly. For
example, the value of CDP available to farms in each MS
is based on regional productivities (such as reference yield
in the region). Farms located in more productive regions
receive higher CDP than farms in less productive regions.
Further, the amount of CDP received by farms depends on
the farms’ crop choice. Farms producing supported
outputs have higher subsidies than farms producing non-
supported outputs. The value of the SPS depends on
coupled payments in the past, and on the average coun-
try/regional productivities. The RDP are allocated based
on project proposals of farms and are subject to fulfilling
certain criteria (for example, farm size, location, speciali-
zation). Hence, the RDP are also non-random, because
farms self-select to participate, and only those with the
best projects (likely to be the more productive farms), and
those that fulfil predefined criteria, are granted RDP
support. This allocation of coupled and decoupled CAP
subsidies implies that in the econometric model they are
endogenous variables reflecting the characteristics of
countries’/regions’ land and farmer’s behaviour. If subsi-
dies are not assigned randomly, then subsidy payments
are correlated with the error term, implying that the
resulting Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of δs
will be biased.
In addition, market prices and subsidy payments are
probably subject to an expectation error. The difference
between the actual and the expected market prices/
subsidies is the expectation error, which is part of the
composite error term potentially biasing the estimates.
Farm decisions are based on a combination of the current
and pre-harvesting information. The expectation error is
less problematic for subsidies in the short–medium run,
because they are set beforehand, and hence are known to
farmers. However, some uncertainty may exist, particu-
larly with respect to coupled subsidies (for example, crop
payments), because they are subject to downward correc-
tion at the farm level, if the sum of all farm applications
for subsidies exceeds the national ceilings. A further
source of expectation error is uncertainty about the future
CAP reforms. However, this error is likely to be less
problematic for profit function estimation, because profits
tend to be determined on a yearly basis reflecting the
given market conditions (as opposed to land prices, which
incorporate the present value of future land rents).
Econometric specification
In order to reduce the individual heterogeneity bias, we
exploit the panel structure of the farm-level data available
from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). To
address these sources of bias, we include farm fixed
effects and regional control variables in the estimable
equations, δf fj and δrRr respectively. In order to absorb
farm-specific time-invariant unobserved factors, we first
difference the series. The resulting farm income model in
the first differences eliminates the unobserved heteroge-
neity component that remains fixed over time.
To address the issue of endogeneity, we employ the
Arellano and Bond (1991) robust two-step generalized
method of moment (GMM) estimator. Arellano and Bond
(1991) have shown that lagged endogenous variables can
be a valid instrument in panel data setting. The GMM
estimator is particularly suitable for datasets with a large
number of cross-sections and few periods and it requires
that there is no autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Kielyte, 2008). To correct for the intrinsic downward bias
of the robust two-step GMM standard errors, we use the
Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust variances. The
final econometric specification which we estimate is:
Δ∏jt = δ0 + δCDPΔCDPjt + δRDPΔRDPjt + δSPSΔSPSjt + δXΔXjt
+ δrRr + εjt
(4)
where Πjt is the profit of farm j in period t and Rr is a
vector of regional variables.
Data and variable construction
The main source of the data used in the empirical analysis
is the FADN, which is compiled and maintained by the
European Commission. The FADN is a European-wide
system of sample surveys that take place every year and
collect structural and accountancy data about farms. In
total, there is information about 150 variables on farm
structure, yield, output, costs, subsidies and taxes, in-
come, balance sheet and financial indicators. Sample sizes
vary from country to country (between 500 and 20,000
observations, while most countries have about 1,500–
10,000), representing a population of around 5,000,000
farms, covering approximately 90% of the total utilized
agricultural area and accounting for more than 90% of the
total agricultural production. The aggregate FADN data
are publicly available. However, farm-level FADN data,
which we employ in this study, are confidential and, for
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the purposes of this study, accessed under a special
agreement.
To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of
micro-economic data that is harmonized (the bookkeeping
principles are the same across all EU MS) and is repre-
sentative of the commercial agricultural holdings in the
whole EU. Farms are selected to take part in the survey on
the basis of a sampling scheme established at the level of
every region in the EU. The survey does not, however,
cover all the agricultural holdings in the EU, but only
those which are of a size allowing them to rank as com-
mercial holdings. The FADN data constitute a panel
dataset, which means that farms that stay in the sample
over consecutive years can be traced over time using a
unique identifier. In this study we use a balanced panel
for 1999–2007 covering the EU-15: Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Finland, Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden
and the UK.
The description of constructed variables is presented in
Table 1. The dependent variable in equation (4) (ΔΠjt) is
calculated as the change in net farm income. The net farm
income is obtained by subtracting taxes, variable expenses
(intermediate, land, labour) and fixed costs (depreciation
and interest payments) from the total farm revenues
(output and subsidies). We estimate equation (4) per
hectare, which means that we divide the obtained net
farm income by the utilized agricultural area. The advan-
tage of using per hectare values instead of totals per farm
is the reduction of the potential problem of
heteroskedasticity. The farm size varies strongly in coun-
tries covered by this study, implying that the value of
farm income, as with the other variables described below
(output, subsidies), will also vary significantly in the
cross-sectional dimension. The FADN data contain three
main groups of subsidies: CDP (crop area payments,
animal payments); the RDP (investment support, environ-
mental payments, LFA and other rural development
payments); and the SPS. To account for taxes and other
types of subsidies, we construct a variable known as
‘other subsidies’ by subtracting taxes from the rest of the
farm payments not included in the above categories.
The covariates matrix, X, includes a set of explanatory
variables, which contribute to explaining the variation in
profits among farms (Table 2). The aim of covariates is to
identify more effectively the true relationship between
Table 1. Description of variables used in the study.
Variable name Unit Description
Dependent variable (π)
Net farm income EUR/ha Total farm revenues (output and subsidies) minus taxes, variable expenses (inter-
mediate, land, labour), depreciation, and interest payments. The value obtained is
divided by UAA to obtain the hectare value of farm income.
Subsidies (s)
Coupled payments (CDP) EUR/ha Hectare value of all farm subsidies on livestock and crops, including compensatory
payments/area payments and set-aside premiums.
Decoupled payments (RDP) EUR/ha Hectare value of SPS.
RDP EUR/ha Hectare value of RDP subsidies.
Other subsidies (OS) EUR/ha Hectare value of other coupled and RDP not included in the above subsidy categories
minus taxes.
Covariates (X)
Output EUR/ha Hectare value of total output of crops and crop products, livestock and livestock
products and of other output.
Rented land ratio % Ratio of rented area to UAA.
Own labour ratio % Ratio of unpaid input to total labour.
Sharecropped land % Ratio of sharecropped land to UAA.
Farm size ha Economic size of holding expressed in European size units (ESU).
Land per capita ha per capita Ratio of total agricultural area to total population at MS level.
GDP growth Index Index of GDP growth at MS level.
Irrigated land ratio % Ratio of irrigated land to UAA.
Glass land ratio % Ratio of the area under glass or plastic to UAA.
Fallow land ratio % Ratio of fallow and set-aside land to UAA.
Woodland ratio % Ratio of woodland area to UAA.
Output livestock ratio % Ratio of total livestock output to total farm output.
Own consumption ratio % Ratio of farmhouse consumption and farm use to total output.
Liabilities-to-assets ratio % Ratio of total liabilities to total farm assets.
Farm product stock EUR/ha Stock of agricultural products divided by UAA.
Investment EUR/ha Gross investment divided by UAA.
Building machinery per ha EUR/ha Value of buildings and machinery divided by UAA.
LU Number of head Total livestock units.
Sectoral and regional dummy variables (R)
Variables in R [0; 1] Year, sector, country, LFA region and their interaction terms.
Notes: All variables are calculated from FADN data, except for land per capita and GDP growth, which use agricultural land from
FAOSTAT, the total population from the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database and GDP growth rate from Eurostat. UAA =
utilized agricultural area.
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farm profits and subsidies. We include four sets of
explanatory variables: covariates linked to owned inputs,
productivity, management practices and macro-economic
factors. Covariates linked to farm-owned inputs include
rented land ratio, own labour ratio, own consumption
ratio and liabilities-to-assets ratio. The objective is to
account for the effect of farm-owned inputs on farm
profits because they reduce farm costs. At the same time,
these variables control for potential differences in incen-
tives of farmers in using their own versus rented/hired
land/capital/labour (Pollak, 1985; Binswanger and
Rosenzweig, 1986; Kancs and Ciaian, 2010). In order to
account for differences in rental contracts, we follow
Ciaian and Kancs (2012), and construct a variable
‘sharecropped land’ by dividing the sharecropped area
by the total utilized agricultural area (UAA). Covariates
linked to productivity include output, farm size, irri-
gated land ratio, glass land (area under glass) ratio,
investment, and building machinery per ha. Given that
productivity is an important determinant of farm profit-
ability, if not controlling for the productivity variation
between farms, it may be confounded with the estimated
subsidy effect on profits. As the names of variables
imply, we capture productivity differences between
farms by constructing variables for output attained per
hectare (output), whether irrigation and greenhouses are
used on-farm (irrigated land ratio, glass land ratio), for
the amount of farm investment (investment) and for
capital intensity (building machinery per ha). A variable
capturing farm size is also included. Studies find that
farm size may be an important determinant of productiv-
ity in agriculture (Feder, 1985; Allen and Lueck, 2002;
Gorton and Davidova, 2004). Similar to productivity,
management practices affect the organization of farm
activities, production structure and application of differ-
ent farm inputs, and thus also have a direct impact on
farm profitability. Covariates capturing
management practices include variables linked to land
management (fallow land ratio, woodland ratio), output
structure (output livestock ratio, LU) and production
organization (farm product stock, own consumption
Table 2. Variables used in the GMM estimation.
Variable Lags
Dependent variable
Net farm income 1
Endogenous variables
RDP 0 and 1
CDP 0 and 1
SPS 0 and 1
Other subsidies (OS) 0 and 1
Output 1
Building machinery per ha 1
Farm product stock 0
Investment 1
Exogenous variables
Land per capita; rented land ratio; sharecropped land 0
ratio; own labour ratio; livestock output ratio; own
consumption ratio; liabilities-to-assets ratio; trend,
GDP growth; land per capita; and other dummies
for sector, country, and their interaction terms
ratio). Finally, the fourth set of variables covers macro-
economic drivers of farm profitability (land per capita,
GDP growth). They account for non-agricultural pressures
on agricultural technology and competition for resources
(such as land).
To account for regional unobserved heterogeneities, we
include sectoral, regional and time dummies, R (year,
sector, country, LFA region) (Table 2). In general, these
variables capture unobserved heterogeneities, which
represent common characteristics for all farms, but may
differ among regions and sectors (for example, informal
and formal rural institutions, differences in climatic
conditions, and market imperfections).
To account for the dynamic adjustment of farm income,
we create lagged dependent (1 lag) and lagged explana-
tory (0 and 1) variables. For all endogenous variables, we
first use lags as instruments along the exogenous and
lagged dependent variables. The choice of lags as instru-
ments was selected by checking the validity of different
sets of instruments. Table 2 summarizes both the endog-
enous and exogenous variables.
Results and policy implications
We estimate two models: model 1 with contemporaneous
values of variables, and a dynamic model 2, which also
includes lagged variables. Table 3 summarizes the main
results. Following the standard convention, we start with
Table 3. Arellano–Bond estimates of farm income.
Model 1 Model 2
I SPS 0.772*** 0.618***
SPS (–1) 0.202*
RDP 1.088*** 0.930***
RDP (–1) 0.473
CDP 0.722*** 0.663***
CDP (–1) 0.0816
II Other subsidies (OS) 0.784 0.883
Other subsidies (OS) (–1) 1.120***
Output 0.646*** 0.610***
Farm product stock 0.836*** 0.428
Investment –0.103* –0.0968*
Investment (–1) –0.0211 –0.0507
Rented land ratio 504.9*** 328.9*
Sharecropped land ratio 584.2*** 479.3***
Farm size 0.524*** 0.433**
GDP growth –1.063 –1.339
Land per capita 194.5 303.7
Own labour ratio 205.8* 265.2**
Livestock output ratio –67.68 –64.05
Own consumption ratio –669.6*** –633.7***
Liabilities-to-assets ratio –594.4*** –602.4***
Constant –8,229 –17,805
III Observations 50,619 50,619
Number of farms 7,553 7,553
Sargan test (Prob > chi2) 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano–Bond
autocorrelation test
AR(1) (Prob > z) 0.0000 0.0000
AR(2) (Prob > z) 0.1273 0.3234
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All estimates are based on the
period 1999–2007.
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specification tests (empirical analysis was performed
using STATA v.12.1). We employ the Arellano-Bond
statistics to test for serial dependence of errors. Serial
correlation of an order higher than 1 would imply a mis-
specification of the model. Test results are reported in
panel III of Table 3. The specification tests indicate strong
evidence against the null hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 1,
but reject autocorrelation in the differenced errors at order
2. The Sargan test statistics suggest that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions
are valid for the income equation; otherwise, the Sargan
test would imply that instruments might be correlated
with residuals, and thus would fail to fulfil the exogeneity
condition. To account for heteroskedasticity, we follow
Windmeijer (2005) and use robust standard errors.
According to the results reported for both empirical
models in panel I of Table 3, all estimated subsidy coeffi-
cients have the expected sign and most of them are
statistically significant. The estimation results suggest that
subsidies importantly affect farm income: the net farm
income increases by between 0.66 euro and 1.09 euro per
additional euro of subsidy. The estimates are relatively
stable across the models. The subsidy income effect higher
than one estimated for the RDP in model 1 may be caused
by the interaction of subsidies with the farm credit con-
straint. Credit-constrained farms may substitute subsidies
with credit and thus increase input use intensity, leading
to productivity upgrade and hence higher farm income
(Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009).
Table 3 also shows that the income effect of the CAP
subsidies is different for different payment types (models
1 and 2). The RDP has the highest income effect (between
0.93 and 1.09). The estimates for the SPS are between 0.77
and 0.82. Note that the coefficient associated with lagged
subsidies is significant only for the SPS, implying that its
total income effect is 0.82 in model 2. As expected, the
estimated income effect for CDP is the lowest in both
models, between 0.66 and 0.72.
These results are consistent with the theoretical hy-
pothesis, except for the RDP, which are estimated higher
than the theory predicts. According to the theoretical
predictions, a substantial share of the RDP may be capital-
ized into input prices (for example, land rents, capital
cost) and hence benefit input suppliers (for example,
landowners, capital suppliers) instead of farmers (Dewbre
et al, 2001; Ciaian et al, 2008). However, due to the fact that
agricultural demand is small in the overall capital de-
mand, the RDP (for example, investment support)
probably does not affect capital prices. Second, because a
large share of the RDP is not linked to land, they do not
directly affect rental prices. Further, the RDP may substi-
tute (crowd out) private on-farm activities (for example,
farm investments, adoption of innovative management
practices) without causing additional effects on farm
behaviour. In such a case, the RDP represent a pure
income transfer to farms (implying a coefficient close to
one consistent with the estimates reported in Table 3).
This result was confirmed by the estimates of Michalek et
al (2015) for the Schleswig-Holstein region in Germany.
Their results show that the majority of investment support
ends up as income transfer to farms by increasing their
private off-farm spending.
The estimates of covariates are reported in panel II of
Table 3. Most of the estimated coefficients have the
expected sign and are statistically significant. Output has
a positive and significant impact on farm income. Surpris-
ingly, the investment variable has a statistically negative
impact on farm profits. This could be due to the fact that
farmers often invest during times when the profit is high;
hence they incur a higher cost and thus attain lower
profits. Since the effect of an investment may be visible
only over a longer period, our estimates do not capture
well this profit-enhancing effect over time. Farm income
increases with farm size, which may reflect the presence
of economies of scale. The land abundance variable (land
per capita) is positive, but not statistically significant.
GDP growth does not have a statistically significant
impact on farm income. The shares of both rented land
and sharecropped land increase farm income. This is
somewhat unexpected, because the cultivation of rented
and sharecropped land is usually associated with higher
costs due to rental payments to landowners, as well as
lower incentives compared with the cultivation of farm-
ers’ own land. However, this might be offset by other
effects, which could be stronger (for instance, the extent of
renting may be a proxy for more dynamic and growing
farms) (Feder, 1985), leading to a positive sign.
The share of farmers’ own labour increases farm
profits. This is probably because of the cost-reducing
effect of farmers using their own labour on-farm. The
liabilities-to-assets ratio reduces farm income, which may
be primarily due to higher costs associated with using
external financing of farm activities. This could also be
caused by lower ability to raise loans of more highly
indebted farms and thus leading to lower productivity.
The estimated coefficient associated with the livestock
output ratio suggests that a higher rate of farmers’ own
consumption reduces farm income, which is possibly
because of the smaller market orientation of farms pro-
ducing for self-consumption. Statistically, however, it is
not significant. The ‘own consumption ratio’ decreases
farm income because on-farm consumption of outputs
reduces the quantity available for off-farm sales.
These results have important policy implications for the
implementation and future reforms of the CAP. In terms of
farm income, the most transfer-efficient policy instrument
seems to be the RDP, followed by the SPS, whereas the least
effective is CDP. This suggests that the initiated shift in the
CAP expenditure towards decoupled payments, rural
development support and the provision of public goods
and externalities is also in line with respect to supporting
farmers’ income. Even though the SPS is less transfer-
efficient than the RDP, a substantial amount of policy gains
(more than 77%) still ends up with farms. Given the current
importance of the SPS (representing around two-thirds of
the total CAP budget), income dependency on the SPS is
substantial for many farms. According to the FADN data,
the share of the SPS in the total output value varies between
5% and 40% in different MS.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the income distributional effects of
CAP subsidies. According to theoretical studies, the
income distributional effects depend substantially on the
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subsidy type. In well-functioning agricultural markets,
input suppliers (such as landowners) and consumers
would benefit from a large share of CAP subsidies instead
of farmers. This is particularly the case with CDP and
RDP, because they affect both output and input prices and
thus generate leakage of policy rents to input suppliers
and consumers. In particular, landowners might poten-
tially be large beneficiaries of CDP and RDP due to
relatively inelastic land supply (Goodwin et al, 2003;
Lence and Mishra, 2003; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008;
Kirwan, 2009; Breustedt and Habermann, 2011; Michalek
et al, 2014; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Patton et al, 2008). The
SPS are less prone to the leakage issue, because they are
decoupled from production and only partially coupled to
input (land) use. As a result, they may generate higher
policy gains for farms compared to CDP and RDP. How-
ever, studies that account for market imperfections (such
as credit constraints) or farm behavioural effects indicate
that all types of subsidies may have other unintended
effects on farms, and may reverse the above-suggested
income distributional effects.
To estimate empirically the impact of agricultural
subsidies on farm income in the EU, we employed the
GMM estimator and used the FADN farm-level panel data
for the period 1999–2007. Our results suggest that farmers
benefit from a major share of CAP subsidies. According to
our estimates, farmers gain more than two-thirds of the
CAP payments: 66–72%, 77–82% and 93–109% from CDP,
SPS and RDP respectively. Hence, our results provide
evidence that farm income benefits are substantial from
the CAP in the EU.
These results have important policy implications for
the implementation and future reforms of the CAP. In
terms of farm income, the most transfer-efficient policy
instrument seems to be the RDP, followed by the SPS,
whereas the least effective is CDP. This suggests that the
initiated shift in CAP expenditure towards decoupled
payments, rural development support and the provision
of public goods and externalities is also in line with
supporting farmers’ income.
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